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People hold strong beliefs about the role of emotional cues in detecting deception. 
While research on the diagnostic value of such cues has been mixed, their influence on 
human veracity judgments is yet to be fully explored. Here, we address the relationship 
between emotional information and veracity judgments. In Study 1, the role of emotion 
recognition in the process of detecting naturalistic lies was investigated. Decoders’ veracity 
judgments were compared based on differences in trait empathy and their ability to recognize 
micro-expressions and subtle expressions. Accuracy was found to be unrelated to facial cue 
recognition and negatively related to empathy. In Study 2, we manipulated decoders’ emotion 
recognition ability and the type of lies they saw: experiential or affective (emotional and 
unemotional). Decoders either received emotion recognition training, bogus training, or no 
training. In all scenarios, training did not affect veracity judgments. Experiential lies were 
easier to detect than affective lies; however, affective unemotional lies were overall the 
hardest to judge. The findings illustrate the complex relationship between emotion 
recognition and veracity judgments, with abilities for facial cue detection being high yet 
unrelated to deception accuracy. 
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Decades of deception research has consistently found that human lie detection ability 
is poor (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). People are also overconfident in their ability (Holm & 
Kawagoe, 2010) and biased towards assuming that most statements are honest (i.e. truth-
biased; Levine, Park, & McCornack, 1999). Some scholars argue that decoders’ lackluster 
performance is due to their inability to detect subtle behavioral differences between liars and 
truth-tellers, especially related to emotions (Ekman, 2003a). Implicitly, this assumes that (1) 
there exist diagnostic behavioral cues of deceit, and (2) decoders can make rational veracity 
judgments if they use such cues. This approach has resulted in a theoretical standstill (partly 
due to the low reliability of behavioral cues in predicting deception) and a lack of research on 
people’s veracity judgment processes.  
Indeed, there are few theoretical models of human veracity judgment, with both 
classical (e.g., Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981) and newer attempts (e.g., Levine, 
2014b; Street, 2015) placing a growing emphasis on decoders’ perception of alleged “cues of 
deceit”, thereby using accuracy as the primary metric of interest. Here, we recontextualize 
human deception detection, moving away from a focus on accuracy (i.e., the correct 
perception and interpretation of behavioral cues) towards a veracity judgment approach in 
which the rationale, predictions, and interpretation of effects are conceptualized as a 
judgmental process. We illustrate how deception research can develop new theoretical 
insights by shifting focus from accuracy to veracity judgments. 
Emotion-based lie detection 
Arguably the most influential perspective in deception detection research has been the 
emotion-based approach (EBA). The EBA purports the existence of behavioral differences 
between liars and truth-tellers relating to the emotions senders experience (Ekman, 2003a). 






Liars will “leak” subtle behavioral cues that betray their lies, referred to as emotional cues 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1969). The EBA argues that a decoder’s ability to recognize emotional 
cues relates to their ability to detect deception, with more perceptive decoders being more 
accurate (Ekman, 2009). 
An important aspect that is often overlooked relates to potential differences between 
the claim of emotional cues being diagnostic of deceit and the claim that people can use such 
cues to make accurate veracity judgments. The EBA tends to conflate the two, with poor 
accuracy being attributed to the absence of such cues and/or the decoder’s lack of knowledge 
of such cues. This assumes that humans have the perceptual and cognitive mechanisms 
necessary to utilize emotional cues to make rational decisions.  
The first claim has received little support in the literature. While research finds that 
some behaviors are associated with deceit (Hartwig & Bond, 2014; Hurley & Frank, 2011), 
these are scarce, unreliable, and rarely veracity-specific (DePaulo et al., 2003). Indeed, Luke 
(2019) recently argued that past findings on deceptive cues should be treated with caution and 
skepticism as they can be explained by a combination of publication bias and questionable 
research practices. As such, being an astute decoder has little bearing on accurate veracity 
judgments if there are no reliable cues to decode. The second claim is the focus of the current 
paper. 
Given this lack of empirical support for reliable emotional cues, the EBA has been 
heavily disparaged (Burgoon, 2018; Vrij, 2008). In this paper, we argue that emotions should 
not be overlooked in deception research as they are important for understanding human 
veracity judgments. Such research is relevant given the rise in emotion-based deception 
detection programs being proposed or implemented in real-world scenarios, seemingly 
disregarding the criticisms levied against them (Burgoon, 2018; Denault et al., 2020; 






Zloteanu, 2020). Shifting focus from accuracy to veracity judgments can provide new 
insights regarding emotions and deception. In line with this proposition, the present research 
explores how decoders’ emotion recognition ability and senders’ emotions influence veracity 
judgments.  
Emotional cues  
Emotional cues are argued to result from the emotions associated with lying (e.g., fear 
or guilt), thereby producing uncontrollable behaviors that betray the lie (i.e. the leakage 
hypothesis, Ekman & Friesen, 1969). EBA proponents argue that facial expressions are the 
strongest source of such cues (Ekman, 2003b). The reasoning for this is two-fold. First, 
genuine facial expressions of emotion are involuntary and insuppressible (Hurley & Frank, 
2011), meaning that they always occur when lying. Second, genuine and deceptive emotional 
expressions differ in their appearance as the facial muscles involved in real affect cannot be 
voluntarily activated, called reliable muscles (Ekman, 2003b). Below we consider each point. 
The few studies to investigate the leakage hypothesis relied on video analysis for the 
presence of emotional cues. Such research reported that, in both laboratory (Frank & Ekman, 
1997) and naturalistic conditions (Porter & ten Brinke, 2008; Porter, ten Brinke, & Wallace, 
2012), lies and truths could be classified to a degree based on emotional cues. However, even 
when using a frame-by-frame analysis the number of cues was minuscule and no emotion 
was found to be veracity-specific (Porter et al., 2012), contradicting the core tenant of this 
approach. Of note, such results do not reflect the overall trend in the literature. Meta-analyses 
find that emotional cues are not reliable predictors of deception (DePaulo et al., 2003) nor 
does the emotionality of the lie predict its detectability (Hartwig & Bond, 2014).  
The foundation of the ‘reliable muscles’ perspective stems from early research on 
smiling, proposing clear differences between genuine and non-genuine smiles (first noted by 






Duchenne, 1862; Ekman, 2003b). However, robust examinations have found little evidence 
for muscles to activate only during genuine displays or genuine displays sharing a unique 
appearance (Krumhuber & Manstead, 2009). This is unsurprising as emotion scholars 
contend that internal emotional states and external expressions are related but separate 
phenomena (Gunnery & Hall, 2014). Thus, there is little reason to assume a priori that 
emotional cues would be diagnostic of deceit. 
So far, investigations of the diagnostic relation between emotional cues and deception 
lack empirical and theoretical support. Even those studies which report the presence of 
emotional cues for achieving classification accuracy (through video coding) fail to obtain 
consistent results, partly because human decoders cannot reliably detect veracity above 
chance performance (Frank & Ekman, 1997; Porter et al., 2012). Thus, even if emotional 
cues exist, without the use of technology people do not or cannot use such information to 
improve accuracy.  
Nonetheless, it would be erroneous to conclude that emotions do not play a role in the 
veracity judgment process. Regardless of their diagnostic value, emotional cues—especially 
facial expressions—impact naïve observers’ judgments (Stewart, Waller, & Schubert, 2009). 
Facial expressions receive preferential attention (Fernández-Dols, Wallbott, & Sanchez, 
1991) and processing in the brain (Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001). People 
make quick inferences of others based on their facial expressions, even when briefly 
presented (Willis & Todorov, 2006), and can reliably classify facial expression of emotions 
with high accuracy (Ekman, 2003b; Nelson & Russell, 2013). However, they are not accurate 
at determining if the emotions they perceive are genuine or fabricated (Krumhuber, Likowski, 
& Weyers, 2014; Zloteanu, Krumhuber, & Richardson, 2018, 2020). 






Cross-culturally, people hold strong beliefs that facial expressions and emotion-
related behavior can predict deception which in turn often heavily influences their assessment 
of veracity (Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & Merckelbach, 2016; The Global Deception Research 
Team, 2006). Given that people prefer, focus on, and assign more weight to nonverbal 
information when making judgments about others (see Bond, Howard, Hutchison, & Masip, 
2013), a picture emerges where emotional cues are less a tool for detecting deception and 
more a source for bias and inaccuracy. 
Veracity judgments 
The literature on veracity judgments is complex and spans beyond emotion-based 
research. Within that realm the truth-bias is one of the most reliable effects (Bond & DePaulo, 
2006; Hartwig & Bond, 2014), describing a phenomenon where people tend to assume that 
most information is honest unless prompted otherwise (also referred to as “truth default”; 
Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990; Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988). In the deception literature, 
the truth-bias can be regarded as an overestimation of the proportion of truths and an 
underestimation of the proportion lies within a sample (Mccornack & Parks, 1986; 
Zuckerman, DePaulo, et al., 1981).  
Recent accounts propose that “bias” may not be the correct interpretation of such a 
phenomenon. The Truth Default Theory (TDT; Levine, 2014b) proposes that telling the truth 
is the default state for humans. As such, to accurately detect deception decoders must 
overcome this default. Conversely, the Adaptive Lie Detection account (ALIED; Street, 2015) 
argues that the truth-bias is an experience-based heuristic. ALIED argues that people’s 
position is based on context. In situations where lying is infrequent people will assume that 
others are honest most of the time. In situations where lying may be frequent (e.g., police 
interviews) people will assume more dishonesty. This also explains the shift in truth-bias and 






the existence of a lie-bias (i.e. an overestimation of lies) in situations of suspiciousness (Kim 
& Levine, 2011; Masip, Alonso, Garrido, & Herrero, 2009; McCornack & Levine, 1990; 
Meissner & Kassin, 2002). Both approaches still emphasize that people decode and make 
judgments based on behavioral cues. 
Another often overlooked veracity effect is the demeanor bias (Levine, 2010; Riggio 
& Friedman, 1983). It describes the phenomenon of some senders producing a general 
impression of honesty (or dishonesty) regardless of their veracity (Riggio, Tucker, & 
Throckmorton, 1987; Zuckerman, Larrance, Spiegel, & Klorman, 1981). This has been 
proposed as an explanation for the slightly (but consistently) above chance deception 
detection performance of decoders (i.e., the existence of a few “transparent” liars; Levine, 
2016) and for the variability in detection scores across studies. Thus, some judgment patterns 
may be better accounted for by differences between senders than by decoder ability. 
Adding further complexity, one must consider that deception is a dynamic process 
requiring a sender and a decoder. According to Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT; Buller 
& Burgoon, 1996), this interactivity is fundamental to the deception process. In IDT the 
bidirectional nature of the sender-decoder interaction can influence not only the behavior of 
the liar but also that of the decoder (Burgoon, Buller, White, Afifi, & Buslig, 1999). Thus, 
deception and its detection are complex and multi-faceted (for a recent overview, see 
Sternglanz, Morris, Morrow, & Braverman, 2019). Our current exploration is focused on the 
emotion-based dimension of this larger problem. 
Present research 
This research explores the role of emotion recognition and emotional cues in decoder 
veracity judgments. Typical investigations of human deception detection assume that 
detectable cues exist, thereby focusing on differences and manipulations which may relate to 






their perception or efficient usage. This is not the approach taken here, and in fact, it is one 
we criticize. We propose that emotional cues do not reliably relate to deception detection, yet 
such ‘cues’ do impact people’s judgment. We argue for a shift from deception detection 
accuracy to veracity judgment with a focus on the decoder’s judgment process. Typically, 
decoders are treated as if performing an intellective task (such as an arithmetic problem, 
where a correct answer exists and problem-solving relates to ability and information). We 
think it is more appropriate to consider decoders as performing a judgmental task (such as 
jury verdicts, where a “correct” answer is a contentious point and investigations explore how 
judgments form; see Carey & Laughlin, 2011). The present research investigates the effect of 
emotional information on decoders’ judgments, varying either as a function of individual 
differences (Study 1) or experimental manipulation (Study 2).  
For this purpose, several assumptions of the EBA were addressed: First, more 
perceptive decoders are better at detecting deception. Second, training in emotional cues can 
aid deception detection. Third, accuracy for detecting deception is higher if the lies contain an 
emotional element. We strongly argue that emotions should not be disregarded in deception 
research. While the literature suggests that emotional cues (such as facial expressions) are not 
diagnostic of deception (especially for human decoders), the current work aims to show that 
emotional information can impact how people judge others. By focusing on the role emotions 
have on veracity judgments, we shall gain novel insights into human deception detection. 
Study 1 
The first study explored the primary assumption of the EBA regarding the relationship 
between human lie detection ability (i.e., real-time detection, unaided by technology) and 
emotion recognition (i.e., perceiving and interpreting emotional information from others’ 






behavior). To that end, two components of the emotion recognition construct were 
considered: facial expression classification and empathy.  
Facial expressions of emotions 
In the following, two types of facial expressions were examined that have been 
proposed by the EBA as relevant to detecting deception: microexpressions and subtle 
expressions.  
Microexpressions are full-faced expressions occurring at <0.5 of a second, resulting 
from failed attempts to mask or suppress one’s true emotions (Ekman, 2003a; Frank & 
Svetieva, 2015), and have been linked to deception detection (Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Porter 
& ten Brinke, 2008). However, the use of microexpressions as cues to detect deception is 
controversial due to the lack of empirical support for this relationship (see Burgoon, 2018; 
Zloteanu, 2020).  
Subtle expressions are partial expressions of suppressed or masked affect, displayed 
with only fragments of the prototypical expression musculature. Unlike microexpressions, 
their presentation is longer in duration, but they are also more ambiguous (Ekman, 2003a; 
Matsumoto & Hwang, 2011). While few studies have researched subtle expressions, EBA 
proponents have suggested that their recognition does relate to veracity judgments (e.g., 
Matsumoto, Hwang, Skinner, & Frank, 2014; Warren, Schertler, & Bull, 2009).  
Empathy 
The second component is empathy, i.e. the ability to accurately perceive and interpret 
others’ emotions (Singer, 2006). Empathy is considered necessary for social communication, 
predicting behavior, and the identification of emotions (Keysers, 2012). Empathy relates to 
the accurate recognition of facial expressions (Besel & Yuille, 2010), even subliminally 






presented (Prochnow et al., 2013), and can aid the detection of mismatched emotions 
(Wojciechowski, Stolarski, & Matthews, 2014); all aspects which form part of the EBA.  
Research on the relationship between empathy and deception detection is scarce. 
Being more empathic relates to better emotional cue classification (Svetieva & Frank, 2016), 
but also poorer veracity judgments (Baker, ten Brinke, & Porter, 2013; Israel, Hart, & Winter, 
2013). While this seems at odds with the EBA’s claims, it can be understood if one 
conceptualizes empathy as being related to emotion classification and not affective 
authenticity discrimination. For instance, DesJardins and Hodges (2015)1 found that more 
empathic decoders were more accurate at inferring the thoughts of their conversation 
partners, but only when they were being honest. Empathy may therefore be useful for 
inferring others’ affective states only when the emotional cues displayed are genuine. 
Facial cues and empathy are two sources EBA proponents suggest as relevant for 
accurate deception detection, such that being more emotionally perceptive should result in 
subtle emotional cues being more readily attended to and perceived by decoders. However, 
given the questionable reliability and diagnosticity of such cues and the poor ability of 
decoders to discriminate genuine from non-genuine cues, we made predictions opposite to 
those of the EBA, namely that emotion recognition hinders lie detection performance.  
Being able to recognize others’ emotions is only useful in predicting affect if the 
emotional cues to be decoded are genuine, not deceptive. In deceptive scenarios, emotional 
cues may be more a source of uncertainty, adding decision difficulty. Hence, more 
 
 
1 DesJardins and Hodges (2015) did not measure empathy explicitly, but simply compared the 
ability of interaction partners to match their perception of a scenario with the intention of their 
partner. 






emotionally perceptive decoders relying on such cues may be particularly likely to 
misinterpret the sender’s true affective state if the cues produced are deceptive, leading to 
poorer deception detection performance (see also Zloteanu, 2015, 2020).  
Method 
Participants 
 Based on estimates from past research on the relationship between individual 
differences in emotion recognition and veracity judgments (Warren et al., 2009) and 
considerations for the smallest effect size of interest (SESOI), we conducted a priori power 
analysis (G*Power 3.1; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) to determine the sample size 
necessary to achieve 80% power of detecting a moderate (ρ = 0.4) size correlation at the 
traditional .05 criterion of statistical significance (one-tailed). Forty-two participants (26 
females, MAge = 23.7, SD = 9.7) were recruited using the university’s online subject pool. 
Participants received course credit or £1 for their time. Informed consent was obtained from 
all participants and all aspects of the experiment were approved by the university’s ethics 
committee (CPB/2013/009). 
Stimuli and materials 
Empathy. Individual differences in empathy were measured using the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983). This multidimensional measure consists of 28 questions, 
7 specific to each of the four subscales (Perspective-taking, Fantasy, Empathic Concern, and 
Personal Distress) to which individuals respond using a letter from A (does not describe me 
well) to E (describes me very well). The IRI has high internal and external validity (Davis & 
Franzoi, 1991) and good test-retest reliability (Davis, 1983). Presently, due to the high 
positive correlation between the subscales of the IRI, rs ≥ .60, ps < .001, JZS BF+0 > 100, the 
overall score for each participant was used (see Karniol & Shomroni, 1999).  






Facial expression recognition. The Micro Expression Training Tool (METT; Ekman, 
2002) is a self-directed training program developed to train microexpression recognition for 
seven basic emotions: happiness, anger, sadness, disgust, fear, surprise, and contempt. The 
software offers a Pre- and Post-Test, Training videos, and Practice module. The software’s 
Pre-test module was used for Study 1. This consists of 14 color portrait photographs of facial 
expressions of emotions (Japanese and Caucasians; 360x360 pixels), two for each emotion. 
The expressions are presented for 100ms in-between two neutral expressions (start and finish) 
of the same person. The facial expressions reflect prototypical expressions of the target 
emotion based on facial activation patterns theorized to reflect the particular emotion 
(Ekman, Friesen, & Hager, 2002). The neutral expression remains on-screen until the 
participant selects one of the seven emotion labels visible during the test. Once all 14 faces 
have been classified, the participant receives a score reflecting the correct number of faces 
being classified. The maximum score is 100%. The METT has been used in past studies (e.g., 
Frank & Ekman, 1997; Warren et al., 2009) and is based on the Brief Affect Recognition Test 
which has good validity and reliability (Matsumoto et al., 2000). 
The Subtle Expression Training Tool (SETT; Ekman, 2002) is intended to train the 
recognition of subtle expressions. The software offers an Introduction, Get Acquainted, and 
Practice module. The Practice module was used which offers a test of subtle expression 
recognition, providing a percentage score at the end. The task contains 37 expressions 
belonging to seven basic emotions. All expressions are presented in black and white using the 
same Caucasian female (360x360 pixels). The target facial expression appears briefly on-
screen and depicts an image morphed with the neutral expression (i.e., the facial musculature 
associated with each expression change). The speed of presentation of the expressions is set 
at the start from 1 (slowest) to 6 (fastest); the setting of 3 was used. In all trials, participants 






see a neutral expression until an emotion label is selected, and they control the progression to 
the next trial using a “Next” button. The instructions for the Practice session remain visible 
on-screen throughout the task. 
Videos. Twenty videos (10 lies, 10 truths) were selected from the Bloomsbury 
Deception Set (BDS; Street et al., 2011). Senders in the videos are describing past vacations 
in different countries, where half of the senders are lying (i.e., fabricating a holiday in a 
country they have never visited). The videos contain naturalistic lies, as the senders were not 
given any incentive to deceive other than being asked to help with a travel documentary and 
believing the film director was oblivious to any deception occurring. The videos were gender-
matched for each veracity and presented in a fixed order. All videos are approximately 33 
seconds in duration 
Design and procedure  
A within-subjects correlational design was employed. Participants were measured on 
their ability to judge truths and lies, their confidence for each veracity decision, trait empathy, 
subtle and microexpression recognition. Participants watched each video and made a veracity 
decision (forced-choice: lie or truth) and provided their confidence on a 5-point scale ranging 
from “not at all confident” to “very confident”. Participants then completed the SETT and 
METT tasks (counterbalanced). The SETT provides ongoing feedback (a “right” or “wrong” 
warning after classifying each expression) and offers a “try again” feature if one responds 
incorrectly. Participants were told to ignore this option and progress to the next expression 
(i.e., they were not allowed to amend their decision even if their initial classification was 
incorrect). Participants’ initial choice was taken for calculating the accuracy score. Finally, 
they completed the IRI and were debriefed. 
Results 






The data were initially screened. One data point was excluded from all subsequent 
analyses using Cook’s distance with a cut-off criterion of 0.5. The final sample was N = 41 
(26 females). All data were analyzed using both frequentist and Bayesian methods. 
Deception detection accuracy 
Overall performance on the deception detection task was 55% (SD = 2.10), which 
significantly differed from chance accuracy (50%), t(40) = 3.04, p = .004, 95% CI [.33, 1.62], 
d = 0.48, JZS BF10 = 8.61. Considering each veracity, truth accuracy was 62% (SD = 1.46) 
and significantly above chance, t(40) = 5.36, p < .001, 95% CI [.76, 1.68], d = 0.84, JZS BF10 
= 4913.52, while lie accuracy was 48% (SD = 1.42) and was not different from chance, t(40) 
= 1.09, p = .281, 95% CI [-.70, .21], JZS BF10 = 0.29; the performance differences between 
veracities was significant, t(40) = 4.63, p < .001, 95% CI [.82, 2.10], d = 0.72, JZS BF10 = 
574.20. A Pearson’s correlation between accuracy and judgment confidence did not find a 
significant relationships, r(41) = -.125, p = .440, 95% CI [-.42, .19], JZS BF10 = 0.26. 
Judgment bias 
Participants’ response bias was considered. This reflects the total number of “truth” 
and “lie” judgments for the videos compared to the expected value given the base-rate. Each 
“truth” response was coded as +1, while each “lie” response was coded as -1, then summed 
across the videos. A positive score indicates a truth-bias, a score of 0 indicates no bias, while 
a negative score indicates a lie-bias. The analysis revealed that decoders were overall truth-
biased in their judgments (one-sample t-test), t(40) = 4.63, p < .001, 95% CI [1.65, 4.21], d = 
0.72, JZS BF10 = 574.20.  
Facial cue recognition 
Participants were able to recognize microexpressions with 65.46% (SD = 14.30%) 
accuracy and subtle expressions with 61.25% (SD = 10.30%) accuracy. To assess whether 






veracity judgments were related to the ability to detect facial cues, METT and SETT2 scores 
were analyzed using Pearson’s correlations against total accuracy on the deception detection 
task, and subsequently with the truth and lie accuracies.  
For the METT, neither overall accuracy, r(41) = .002, p = .99, 95% CI [-.31, .31], JZS 
BF10 = 0.20, nor truth, r(41) = .072, p = .660, 95% CI [-.24, .37], JZS BF10 = 0.21, or lie 
accuracy, r(41) = -.070, p = .660, 95% CI [-.37, .24], JZS BF10 = 0.21, were significantly 
correlated. Similarly, no significant correlations were found for the SETT scores and 
accuracy; either for overall, r(40) = -.214, p = .190, 95% CI [-.49, .11], JZS BF10 = 0.46, 
truth, r(40) = -.194, p = .230, 95% CI [-.48, .13], JZS BF10 = 0.40, or lie accuracy, r(40) = 
-.108, p = .51, 95% CI [-.42, .21], JZS BF10 = 0.24. SETT and METT scores also did not 
correlate, r(40) = .102, p = .530, 95% CI [-.22, .40], JZS BF10 = 0.24.  
Empathy 
Accuracy and empathy scores were significantly negatively correlated, r(41) = -.382, 
p = .014, 95% CI [-.62, -.08], JZS BF10 = 3.40. Planned correlations for each veracity score 
with empathy revealed the predicted negative correlation between lie detection accuracy and 
empathy, r(41) = -.362, p = .010 (one-tail), 95% CI [-.60, -.06], JZS BF10 = 2.80, but no 
positive correlation between truth detection accuracy and empathy, r(41) = -.183, p = .130 
(one-tail), 95% CI [-.47, .13], JZS BF10 = 0.38.  
The potential relationship between empathy and bias was also investigated, but was 
found to be non-significant, r(41) = .123, p = .440, 95% CI [-.19, .42], JZS BF10 = 0.26. 
Similarly, the relationship between empathy and confidence was not significant, r(41) = .065, 
 
 
2 Due to incomplete data, one participant was removed from the SETT analyses. The sample 
for these analyses is N = 40 (14 males). 






p = .690, 95% CI [-.25, .37], JZS BF10 = 0.21. Finally, empathy did not correlate with either 
microexpression recognition, r(41) = .237, p = .136, 95% CI [-.08, .51], JZS BF10 = 0.57, or 
subtle expression recognition, r(40) = .094, p = .566, 95% CI [-.23, .39], JZS BF10 = 0.23.  
Considering empathy as a potential mediator for the facial cue recognition and 
accuracy relationship did not provide any further insights, as neither the direct, b = .015, t(40) 
= .63, p = .532, JZS BF10 = 0.30, or indirect effect, b = .001, t(40) = .011, p = .991, JZS BF10 
= 0.20, were statistically significant. 
Discussion  
The study revealed the predicted negative relationship between empathy and people’s 
ability to detect deceptive statements. No relationship between facial cue detection and 
accuracy was found, although decoders were able to classify microexpressions and subtle 
expressions with high probability (~63%; higher than chance at 14.3%). The accuracy 
findings are in line with those reported in the deception field (Bond & DePaulo, 2006), and 
highlight the theoretical advantage of adopting a veracity judgment perspective with the use 
of Bayesian analyses to provide evidence for or against particular data structures. 
The negative relationship between empathy and lie detection implies that being more 
attuned to the emotions of others may be detrimental for discerning veracity. Interestingly, 
empathy was not related to a systematic response tendency (i.e. bias). As such, the finding 
cannot be explained by empathic decoders being more inclined to believe deceptive 
statements (i.e., gullibility). Rather it seems likely that high empathics misinterpreted 
deceptive emotional cues as reflecting genuine affect, impacting their decision-making, and 
leading to more erroneous lie judgments (see Stel & Vonk, 2009).  
Empathy is a multi-dimensional construct and can have different effects based on 
context. For instance, Hubbard (2001) considered empathy as three pathways encompassing 






emotional empathy, cognitive empathy, and emotional contagion. In conflict-related 
interactions (which can involve lying scenarios), these components can operate in opposition. 
To that end, Duran, Cécillon, Sansorgné, and Michael (2018) found that high empathy was 
related to poorer deception detection (particularly in women). This effect was argued to be 
due to low empathics being less affected by emotional contagion, focusing more on non-
emotional cues to detect deception. Their findings resonate with those of the present research 
in the sense that higher empathy hinders lie detection, as decoders are misled or distracted by 
emotional cues which are non-diagnostic of deception. Stel and Vonk (2009) provide further 
supportive evidence for this claim, showing that empathy relates to emotional contagion only 
if the sender’s emotions are perceived to be genuine. 
Consequently, emotion recognition is not found to relate in positive ways to deception 
detection (as argued by EBA proponents) but resulted in the predicted opposite direction. 
Under the premise of accuracy-focused approaches, this finding would be difficult to 
interpret, yet by employing a veracity judgment perspective the findings are plausible: 
emotional information has a different effect depending on whether the scenario is deceptive 
or genuine. In genuine scenarios, empathy may foster successful interaction as it aids 
decoders in answering what emotion the sender is trying to convey. However, being empathic 
can be detrimental in deceptive scenarios as the desire to engage in successful interactions 
may supersede the judgment of emotional authenticity. Here, empathy may not aid decoders 
in answering whether the sender’s displayed emotion matches his/her underlying affect.  
Study 2 
The findings of the first study challenge the EBA which posits that more emotionally 
perceptive decoders are better at detecting deception. Yet, the failure to find an association 
between emotion recognition ability and veracity judgment does not necessarily eliminate the 






possibility of such a relationship under different circumstances. Proponents of the EBA, for 
example, argue that untrained decoders typically rely on incorrect cues and require training to 
improve their accuracy. To expand upon the above findings, we investigated two additional 
EBA assumptions: (1) accuracy depends on the type of lie being decoded, and (2) training in 
facial cue recognition aids deception judgments. The second study also permits the 
examination of decoder judgment across multiple lie scenarios.  
Emotion recognition training 
The allure of the EBA is the supposed universality of emotional cues (Ekman, 2003a; 
cf. Barrett, 2011). If emotional cues generalize to all deceptive situations, training decoders to 
detect them should improve their overall lie-catching ability (Ekman, 2009). This assertion 
has been bolstered by findings showing that micro- and subtle expression identification can 
improve with training (Ekman & Friesen, 1974; Hurley, 2011; Matsumoto & Hwang, 2011). 
Furthermore, deception training providing information about how to classify emotions shows 
positive effects on accuracy (Ekman, O’Sullivan, Friesen, & Scherer, 1991; Frank & Ekman, 
1997; Shaw, Porter, & ten Brinke, 2013). However, such results are rare and do not seem to 
apply to all types of deception (Matsumoto et al., 2014). 
While the effects of training on accuracy are still debated (Driskell, 2012; Hauch, 
Sporer, Michael, & Meissner, 2014; Kassin & Fong, 1999), there is evidence for unwanted 
side-effects from respective interventions. For example, increasing confidence in one’s 
veracity judgments as a function of training (DePaulo & Pfeifer, 1986; Holm & Kawagoe, 
2010) can have severe real-world consequences (see Weinberger, 2010). Similarly, training 
may alter the response tendencies of decoders towards overestimating the frequency of lies 
(i.e. lie-bias; Masip, Alonso, Garrido, & Herrero, 2009). It has also been argued that training 
effects may simply occur due to attentional changes brought about by the nature of the task, 






having little to do with accurately applying specific knowledge (DePaulo, Lassiter, & Stone, 
1982; Levine, Feeley, McCornack, Hughes, & Harms, 2005).  
To systematically test the effects of training, researchers should include a bogus 
training condition as a control. Adding a “no training” control is in itself insufficient as it 
ignores any psychological effects from merely engaging in training. This is especially 
pertinent in the exploration of veracity judgment effects (e.g., changes in bias or confidence), 
yet few have considered this aspect (e.g., Jordan et al., 2019; Levine et al., 2005). 
Based on the existing literature suggesting that training effects are small-to-moderate 
(Driskell, 2012; Hauch et al., 2014) and do not translate for emotion-specific training into 
improved accuracy (Jordan et al., 2019; Matsumoto et al., 2014; see also Burgoon, 2018), it 
seems plausible to focus on veracity judgment effects resulting from training rather than 
performance differences alone.  
Understanding the effects of emotion recognition training on judgment informs 
theoretical understanding and has real-world applications, given the emphasis previously 
placed on its usefulness (see Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2011; Owayjan, Kashour, 
Haddad, Fadel, & Souki, 2012). For example, the Transportation Security Administration in 
the USA has made substantial financial contributions to developing and utilizing the 
Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) approach, which relies heavily on 
nonverbal behavioral detection training including microexpressions (Weinberger, 2010). Yet, 
multiple government accountability reports have published alarming reports of its usefulness, 
arguing for the absence of evidence to support this approach (see Denault et al., 2020). 
Lie type 
Several moderating factors have been proposed to influence sender performance and 
decoder accuracy. According to the EBA detection performance is influenced by the type of 






lie being decoded, the motivation of the liar (or truth-teller), and the stakes surrounding the 
lie. For instance, high-stakes lies (i.e., lies in which potential rewards to the liar for escaping 
detection or punishments for being caught are severe) are argued to be easier to detect than 
low-stakes lies due to the intense emotions experienced by the liar (Frank & Ekman, 1997), 
thereby hampering control over nonverbal behavior (DePaulo & Kirkendol, 1989).  
Under this view, added stakes should produce more frequent and pronounced 
emotional differences between liars and truth-tellers. Equally, the liar’s motivation is argued 
to impact behavior and detectability (see motivational impairment effect; DePaulo & 
Kirkendol, 1989). Such reasoning does have intuitive appeal, with decoders’ accuracy being 
subject to influence by the amount and type of cues in some studies (although these may not 
be specifically emotional cues; Granhag & Strömwall, 2001). Furthermore, emotion 
recognition seems to be stable across the decoding of nonverbal cues (Schlegel, Boone, & 
Hall, 2017), and more accurate decoders self-report that they rely on facial expressions for 
their judgments (Warren et al., 2009).  
While proponents of the EBA argue that stakes/motivation increase the presence of 
cues and their detectability (Frank & Ekman, 1997; O’Sullivan, Frank, Hurley, & Tiwana, 
2009), other scholars question whether these factors have comparable effects on both liars 
and truth-tellers, negating any diagnostic benefit (see overshadowing effect, Hartwig & Bond, 
2014). Accordingly, meta-analyses find no reliable effects of either stakes, motivation, or the 
emotional content of the lie on detectability (Driskell, 2012; Hartwig & Bond, 2014; Hauch et 
al., 2014). Adding further complexity, the stability of human lie detection performance across 
scenarios remains to be debated, with some researchers finding stable decoder performances 
(Frank & Ekman, 1997) while others do not (Vrij, Mann, Robbins, & Robinson, 2006). 






Taking into account the EBA’s assumptions, the equivocal research, and our focus on 
veracity judgments, we employed multiple video sets containing different types of lie. The 
first set contained naturalistic, unmotivated lies told by individuals assisting with a travel 
documentary (see Study 1). These represent experiential lies that one may encounter in daily 
life, where the sender is telling a story relating to an event that may or may not have 
occurred. The second set contained lies related to an emotionally charged event the sender is 
experiencing, where they are either retelling or fabricating their affective experience (see 
stimuli section and Warren et al., 2009). These videos can be divided into two subsets: 
emotional or unemotional. If the sender was lying about experiencing an affective event when 
in reality their experience was neutral, it is referred to as an unemotional lie (i.e., they are 
fabricating an emotion). If the sender was lying about experiencing a neutral event when they 
were experiencing an affective event, it is referred to as an emotional lie (i.e., they are 
suppressing an emotion).  
Utilizing multiple lie scenarios allows for an exploration of decoders’ veracity 
judgment change as a function of the lie type, as well as the stability of their capacity for 
detection across scenarios. Specifically, decoders who rely more on emotional cues for their 
performance may be better/worse overall or they may demonstrate lie-type-specific 
differences. 
We manipulated decoders’ ability to recognize emotional cues by providing emotion 
recognition training which we compared to bogus training or no training. It was hypothesized 
that (1) receiving emotion recognition training (real or bogus) would result in differences in 
veracity judgments and confidence as compared to receiving no training and (2) decoders’ 
veracity judgments would differ based on the type of lie decoded. 








One hundred and six participants (84 females; MAge = 20.9, SD = 4.7) were recruited 
through the university’s online subject pool.  A priori power analysis for an interaction 
between training condition (3), veracity (2), and lie type (2), assuming a medium-sized effect 
(Cohen’s f = 0.18), determined that this sample size would be sufficient for 80% power. 
Participants received course credits for participating. Informed consent was obtained from all 
participants. Ethical approval was granted by the university’s ethics committee. 
Stimuli and materials 
Videos. 20 videos (10 lies) were selected from the BDS. The lies told by senders refer 
to an experiential episode (a past real or fabricated vacation). As the senders were given no 
incentive to lie, it can be assumed that the stakes and motivations to lie were low. The videos 
were controlled for gender in each veracity and were presented in a fixed order.  
The 20 videos (10 lies) from Warren et al. (2009) were used. Senders watched a 
Hawaiian landscape footage or a surgical procedure (in counterbalanced order), used to 
induce mildly positive or severely negative affective responses, respectively. When lying 
senders were instructed to describe what they saw as if it was the opposite video. For their 
second recording, the senders watched the remaining video and described it truthfully. The 
senders also initially recorded a brief (30s) description of their hobbies or interests serving as 
a baseline of their behavior. The two subsets of the affective videos were also considered: an 
emotional set (5 lies, 5 truths) in which the sender watched the surgical videos and an 
unemotional set (5 lies, 5 truths) in which the sender watched the pleasant beach scene. All 
senders were told that “their performance would be judged” and if successful in their 
deception they “would win £10” (Warren et al., 2009, p. 62), adding additional motivation 






and incentive for senders to be believed. The final videos are approximately 1 minute in 
length, each containing a baseline and either a deceptive or truthful statement. The selected 
videos were controlled to not display the same sender twice. 
Emotion recognition training. The training program was constructed using the 
training and practice modules of the METT and the SETT.  
The METT’s training module contains 4 instructional videos describing the seven 
basic facial expressions: anger vs disgust, contempt vs happy, fear vs surprise, fear vs 
sadness. The videos provide distinctions between the respective expressions and explain their 
correct interpretation. The practice module contains 28 microexpressions, presented at 
100ms, to which users respond by selecting one of the seven emotion labels visible on-screen 
throughout the task. If they make an incorrect choice, they can choose to reveal the 
expression and its correct emotion. The user decides at which rate s/he wishes to progress 
through the trials with the use of a “Next” button. The Post-test module used in this study 
contains 14 facial expressions for classification; these are different from those of the Pre-test. 
An accuracy score is provided (out of 100%) at the end. 
The SETT’s Get Acquainted training module illustrates multiple subtle expressions 
for the seven emotions and provides written explanations for their meaning and correct 
interpretation. The user decides the progression rate through each emotion, by clicking a 
“Next” button whenever they are ready to see a new expression. The Practice module offers a 
recognition test with 37 expressions presented at a predetermined speed; the slowest speed 
was used to give participants time to fully understand the expressions. Unlike in Study 1, 
participants could use a “Try again” function when they classified an expression incorrectly 
as the aim of the SETT here was training. This gave them the chance to select another 
emotion label after witnessing the subtle expression again. At the top right side of the screen, 






a performance color-coded score from 1 to 5 was visible which updated based on their 
performance. Participants were also given instant feedback on their decisions in the form of 
either the word “Wrong” (and a red dot) or “Right” (and a green dot) appearing after the 
selection is made. A score is displayed (out of 100%) at the end. 
Design and procedure 
A three-way mixed design was employed. The between-subject variable was Training 
(emotion recognition training, bogus training, and no training), and the within-subjects 
variables were Veracity (lie and truth) and Lie-type (experiential and affective). The 
dependent variables were accuracy, confidence, and response bias. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the three conditions: emotion recognition training (ERT; n = 39), 
bogus training (BT; n = 38), and no training (NT; n = 29). 
In the ERT condition, participants undertook the emotion recognition training. For 
this, they could progress through each component at their own pace. The two video rating 
tasks were then presented in a counterbalanced order. For each video, they had to state their 
decision (forced-choice: lie or truth) and confidence using a 5-point Likert-type scale. The 
procedure took around 65 minutes. 
In the BT condition, participants engaged in a fake training program containing no 
cues of deception or emotion. The program was created using the neutral expressions from 
the METT practice module. Participants were told that the task trains them to “spot subtle 
differences in the face, which translate to spotting cues of deception”. They were shown a 
fixation cross, followed by a face that remained on screen for a predetermined period and was 
replaced with a fixation cross followed by a multiple-choice question. There were three 
blocks with different presentation times: slow (1s), medium (.75s), and fast (.5s). Each block 
contained 18 faces that were controlled for gender. The questions targeted the age, eye color, 






hair color, and facial features of the person in the photo. For each question, participants were 
given four possible responses, e.g. “What was the person’s eye color?” with answers “A. 
Blue, B. Green, C. Brown, D. Black”. The bogus training was created in Matlab (R2012b, 
v8.0). Afterward, participants were given the video rating tasks. The procedure took around 
45 minutes. 
In the NT condition, participants immediately completed the video rating tasks in 
which they provided veracity and confidence responses. The procedure lasted around 35 
minutes. 
Participants in the ERT and BT conditions were also asked about the perceived 
effectiveness of the training: “How effective was the training program?” with response 
options from 1 (not at all effective) to 5 (extremely effective). 
Results 
All analyses (frequentist and Bayesian) account for truth and lie scores separately, as 
recommended for training investigations (see Hauch et al., 2014; Levine et al., 1999).  
Deception detection accuracy  
Participant veracity responses were analyzed to form two variables: accuracy and 
response bias. Accuracy was calculated by matching the veracity of the videos with the 
response participants gave (coded as “correct” or “incorrect”). This was then summed for 
each veracity and lie-type forming a percentage score. To assess response bias, the veracity 
responses of participants were calculated as described in Study 1.  
Overall accuracy was 55.35% for the Experiential videos and 44.6% for the Affective 
videos. To consider how the type of lie affected participants’ veracity judgments, an analysis 
considering training and lie-type was conducted on veracity. A manipulation check revealed 






no difference in perceived training effectiveness between the ERT and BT conditions, t(75) = 
-.241, p = .81, 95% CI [-0.31, 0.24], JZS BF10 = 0.24. 
The results revealed a main effect of lie-type, F(1,103) = 41.41, p < .001, ηp
2 = .287, 
90% CI [0.17, 0.39], JZS BF10 = 5.8e
8, with higher accuracy for Experiential videos (M = 
55.33%, SD = 12.48%) than Affective videos (M = 44.58% , SD = 10.12%), and a main effect 
of Veracity, F(1,103) = 66.73, p < .001, ηp
2 = .393, 90% CI [0.27, 0.50], JZS BF10 = 1.3e
11, as 
overall truths (M = 55.94%, SD = 15.23%) were easier to detect than lies (M = 44.62%, SD = 
15.59%). There was no effect of Training on accuracy, F(2,103) = 1.05, p = .354, JZS BF10 = 
0.10. The interaction between Lie-Type and Veracity was found to be significant, F(1,103) = 
16.37, p < .001, ηp
2 = .137, 90% CI [0.05, 0.24], JZS BF10 = 305.17; no other interaction term 
was statistically significant, Fs < .929, ps > .398, JZS BF10 < 0.12. 
The Lie-type by Veracity interaction was unpacked; first considering differences 
based on Lie-type. Simple effects revealed a significant difference in truth judgments, 
F(1,103) = 59.64, p < .001, ηp
2 = .367 , 90% CI [0.25, 0.47], JZS BF10 = 1.2e
11, with higher 
accuracy for Experiential videos (M = 63.9%, SD = 16.8%) compared to Affective videos (M 
= 48%, SD = 13.6%). Similarly, there was a significant effect for lie judgments, F(1,103) = 
4.00, p = .048, ηp
2 = .037, 90% CI [0.00, 0.11], JZS BF10 = 1.37, with Experiential videos (M 
= 46.8%, SD = 15.4%) being easier to detect than Affective videos (M = 42.5%, SD = 
15.8%). Considering Veracity, simple effects revealed a significant difference between truths 
and lies for Experiential videos, F(1,103) = 71.43, p < .001, ηp
2 = .419, 90% CI [0.29, 0.50], 
JZS BF10 = 2.0e
12, as lies were harder to detect (M = 46.8%, SD = 15.4%) than truths (M = 
63.9%, SD = 16.8%). Similarly, a veracity difference was found for Affective videos, 
F(1,103) = 7.45, p = .007, ηp
2 = .069, 90% CI [0.01, 0.16], JZS BF10 = 8.89, with lies (M = 
42.5%, SD = 15.8%) being harder to detect than truths (M = 48%, SD = 13.6%). See Figure 1. 







---Approx. position of Figure 1--- 
 
Affective subsets: Emotional vs. unemotional. The accuracy difference between the 
two Affective subsets was also investigated. A three-way analysis was performed on the 
affective emotional (AE) and affective unemotional (AU) subsets to account for the type of 
emotion decoders saw. The results of the ANOVA revealed that the type of lie had a 
significant effect on accuracy, F(1,102) = 119.23, p < .001, ηp
2 = .539, 90% CI [0.52, 0.69], 
JZS BF10 = 5.4e
27, with AE videos showing higher accuracy (M = 57.4%, SD = 16.5%) than 
AU videos (M = 31.9%, SD = 12.9%). A main effect of Veracity was also observed, F(1,102) 
= 57.98, p < .001, ηp
2 = .297, 90% CI [0.18, 0.40], JZS BF10 = 3.1e
10, where truths were 
detected with higher accuracy (M = 52.4%, SD = 20.5%) than lies (M = 37.0%, SD = 21.9%). 
No effect of training or interaction was found, Fs ≤ 2.25, ps ≥ .111, JZS BF10 < 0.9. 






Bayesian mixed-effects model. Given the potential variability in senders across the 
videos, an analysis is needed which can account for the sender-decoder variance. A Bayesian 
mixed-effects model (BMEM) was used, using the brms package (Bürkner, 2018) in R 3.6.3 
(R Core Team, 2020). Two models were constructed. The first (Null model) mirrored the 
linear analysis, with fixed effects for Training, Lie Type, and Veracity, and a random effect 
for Participants. The second (Alt model) contained all elements of the Null model with the 
addition of a random effect for Stimuli, accounting for the variance introduced by the 
responses given to specific videos3. An advantage of BMEMs is their ability to cope with 
unevenness in the data, allowing us to run a single model comparing the three video sets 
directly (Experiential, Affective-Unemotional, and Affective-Emotional). 
For each model, the median of the β coefficient posterior distribution and the 
corresponding 95% highest density interval (95% HDI) were calculated, alongside a per 
parameter Bayes factor and Maximum Probability of Effect (MPE). For assessing model fit, 
we computed the leave-one-out cross-validation (LOO) and the Watanabe-Akaike 
information criterion (WAIC). To quantify the evidence in favor of the Alt model, a Bayes 
factor was calculated against the Null model (Table 1). 
Table 1.  
Parameter Estimates, Estimation Error, 95% HDI, Bayes Factors, and MPE 
    95% HDI   
Model Coefficient Estimate EE Lower Upper BF10 MPE (%) 
Null model Intercept -0.09 0.04 -0.17 -0.02 0.07 99.38 
 BT -0.08 0.07 -0.21 0.05 0.01 88.56 
NT -0.04 0.06 -0.17 0.08 7.29e-3 75.27 
AU -0.79 0.07 -0.92 -0.66 4.79e11 100.00 
 
 
3A third, more maximal, model with random slopes for Stimuli by Type and Type by 
Participant was considered; however this posed convergence issues, which after being resolved was 
found to only introduce more complexity with no benefit to estimation over the Alt model (ΔWAIC = 
-6.1; Bayes factor in favor of the simpler model, BF01 = 786.35). 






AE 0.37 0.05 0.27 0.47 5.69e4 100.00 
Veracity(truth) 0.49 0.05 0.39 0.58 6.90e8 100.00 
BT : AU  -0.14 0.12 -0.37 0.09 0.02 87.81 
NT : AU -0.10 0.11 -0.32 0.12 0.02 81.17 
BT : AE -0.06 0.09 -0.24 0.13 0.01 73.29 
NT : AE -0.09 0.09 -0.26 0.09 0.01 83.85 
BT : Veracity             0.06 0.09 -0.11 0.23 9.86e-3 76.27 
NT : Veracity       0.13 0.08 -0.03 0.30 0.03 94.28 
AU : Veracity 0.14 0.09 -0.04 0.32 0.03 93.02 
AE : Veracity 0.03 0.08 -0.12 0.17 7.15e-3 63.19 
BT : AU : Veracity -0.04 0.17 -0.37 0.29 0.02 59.20 
NT : AU : Veracity 0.16 0.16 -0.15 0.48 0.02 83.78 
BT : AE : Veracity 0.03 0.13 -0.24 0.29 0.01 58.00 
NT : AE : Veracity -0.24 0.13 -0.48 0.01 0.07 96.89 
Alt model Intercept -0.09 0.15 -0.39 0.20 0.02 72.62 
 BT -0.09 0.07 -0.24 0.05 0.01 89.58 
NT -0.05 0.07 -0.18 0.09 7.79e-3 73.98 
AU -0.84 0.28 -1.40 -0.28 1.67 99.77 
AE 0.41 0.23 -0.05 0.88 0.10 96.09 
Veracity(truth) 0.54 0.21 0.12 0.96 0.47 99.36 
BT : AU  -0.15 0.12 -0.39 0.09 0.02 88.91 
NT : AU -0.10 0.12 -0.34 0.13 0.02 80.61 
BT : AE -0.07 0.10 -0.27 0.13 0.01 75.94 
NT : AE -0.11 0.10 -0.30 0.08 0.02 86.92 
BT : Veracity  0.07 0.09 -0.11 0.25 0.01 77.22 
NT : Veracity       0.14 0.09 -0.03 0.32 0.03 94/90 
 AU : Veracity 0.12 0.40 -0.67 0.91 0.04 62.47 
 AE : Veracity 0.02 0.33 -0.63 0.67 0.03 52.73 
 BT : AU : Veracity -0.05 0.17 -0.39 0.29 0.02 61.02 
 NT : AU : Veracity 0.17 0.17 -0.16 0.50 0.03 84.72 
 BT : AE : Veracity 0.04 0.14 -0.24 0.32 0.01 61.34 
 NT : AE : Veracity -0.26 0.14 -0.53 0.01 0.08 97.13 
Note. N = 106, EE = estimation error, 95% HDI = highest density interval; BF10 = Bayes 
Factor (Savage-Dickey density ratio); MPE (%) = Maximum Probability of Effect 
 
The values for the goodness of fit of the models are displayed in Table 2.  
Table 2.  
Goodness-of-fit Measures. Pseudo-R2, LOO, WAIC and Bayes factor (BF10) 
Model R2 LOO WAIC BF10 
Null model 0.08 [0.06, 0.09] 2798.6 2798.6 -- 
Alt model 0.19 [0.17, 0.21] 2556.2 2556.2 5.19e
90 
Note. Smaller LOO or WAIC values indicate a better model fit; BF10 = the evidence of the Alt 
model relative to the Null model. 






Based on the model fit statistics (Table 2) as well as visual inspection of the posterior 
predictive check (PPC) plots, the Alt model is superior to the Null model in explaining the 
data and predicting future data. As with the results of the ANOVAs, the data in Table 1 
strongly favor no effect of Training on accuracy, regardless of Veracity or Lie-Type. The 
addition of the Stimuli random effect in the Alt model resulted in slight changes in the 
estimations (Table 1), revealing that the difference in accuracy based on Lie Type is driven by 
the AU condition (EXP vs AU, β = -0.84, 95% HDI [-1.40, -0.28], δt = -0.97, 95% HDI [-
1.65, -0.31]; AE vs AU, β = -1.25, 95% HDI [ -1.97, -0.52], δt = -1.44, 95% HDI [-2.35, -
0.58]) as decoders had poorer judgments in this condition. The Bayes factor indicates only 
anecdotal support for the weaker performance. Both models find the ubiquitous veracity 
effect, with overall higher truth detection. In the Alt model, however, the Bayes factor does 
not provide conclusive evidence for a veracity difference4.  
Judgment confidence  
An analysis considering the effect of Training and Lie-Type on confidence revealed a 
main effect of Lie-Type on confidence ratings, F(1,103) = 6.16, p = .015, ηp
2 = .056, 90% CI 
[0.01, 0.14], JZS BF10 = 1.78, but no main effect of Training, F < 1, p = .579, JZS BF10 = 
0.25. The interaction was statistically significant, F(2,103) = 4.01, p = .021, ηp
2 = .072, 90% 
CI [0.00, 0.11], JZS BF10 = 2.33.  
Simple main effects were conducted to unpack the interaction. With resgard to Lie-
Type, a difference in confidence ratings was found between Experiential (M = 63.41, SD = 
8.31) and Affective (M = 67.13, SD = 8.01) videos in the ERT group, F(1,103) = 10.85, p 
 
 
4 In BMEMs, Bayes factor estimates can be unreliable unless very large sampling is 
conducted and there is sufficient data; hence these should be interpreted with caution. 







2 = .095, 90% CI [0.02, 0.19], JZS BF10 = 15.20. Similarly, there was a difference 
between Experiential (M = 61.97, SD = 10.30) and Affective (M = 65.07, SD = 10.11) videos 
in the Control group, F(1,103) = 5.38 p = .028, ηp
2 = .050, 90% CI [0.00, 0.13], JZS BF10 = 
2.06. No effect occurred for the BT group, F < 1, p = .483, JZS BF10 = 0.29. With regard to  
the interaction based on Training, no differences were found for either video set, Fs ≤ 1.85, ps 
≥ .163, JZS BF10 < 0.39. 
Judgment bias  
Investigating the effect of training on response bias did not reveal an effect of 
Training or Lie-Type, Fs < 1, ps ≥ .431, JZS BF10 < 0.18, or their interaction, F(1, 103) = 
1.59, p = .210, JZS BF10 = 0.30. Participants were overall truth-biased in their responses to 
both the Experiential videos (M = 3.41, SD = 4.09), t(105) = 8.61, p < .001, 95% CI [2.63, 
4.20], d = 1.67, JZS BF10 =  3.0e
10, and the Affective videos (M = 3.08, SD = 5.38), t(105) = 
5.88, p < .001, 95% CI [2.04, 4.11], d = 1.15, JZS BF10 = 2.4e
5. 
Discussion 
Study 2 tested the effect of emotion recognition training on veracity judgments. There 
was no effect of training compared to no training, nor any difference in judgments between 
emotion recognition training or bogus training. These findings align with recent critiques of 
the EBA arguing that a focus on emotional information may not be an optimal strategy 
(Burgoon, 2018; Hartwig & Bond, 2014; Jordan et al., 2019; Zloteanu, 2020). While accuracy 
did not improve, the fact that there was no further decline in accuracy is also noteworthy as 
past interventions have yielded negative outcomes after training (Levine, 2014).  
Most importantly, training did not affect confidence, although a positive trend was 
observed. This is interesting given that training typically bolsters people’s already high 
confidence levels (DePaulo & Pfeifer, 1986). Perhaps the detection task was considered 






difficult and training did not ease the process sufficiently, thereby tempering confidence. 
Overall, decoders were found to be truth-biased which is consistent with the majority of 
research (Levine et al., 1999). Decoders also remained truth-biased in the training conditions, 
contrasting research showing that training reverses the decoder bias (Kim & Levine, 2011). 
The use of multiple types of lies provides a comparison of decoders’ veracity 
judgments across situations. The BMEM revealed that judgment differences were driven by 
AU lies and truths being more difficult to judge compared to both AE and EXP sets, 
suggesting that emotionality influenced decoders. Specifically, when the emotions were 
disingenuous decoder accuracy was hindered, presenting a novel view of how lie-type affects 
judgment.  
A few limitations need to be mentioned. First, while we consider the METT and 
SETT to be appropriate for emotion recognition training, there was no direct pre and post 
training measure of classification performance. As such, we cannot assess the impact of the 
ERT on recognition rates; this also prohibits us from analyzing the relationship between ERT 
and lie types (e.g., how SETT scores correlate with emotional lie detection as in Warren et al., 
2009). Nonetheless, our protocols mirror the standards in the field (e.g., Jordan et al., 2019; 
Warren et al., 2009), employing tools which produce reliable effects (e.g., Hurley, 2012; 
Matsumoto & Hwang, 2011; McDonald, Newby‐Clark, Walker, & Henselwood, 2018). 
Second, the videos were not coded for emotional cues, nor did we question decoders whether 
they had relied on such information given that self-reports rarely provide accurate insights 
into judgment processes. Third, the valence of the AE set may have contributed to the pattern 
of results. When investigating multiple types of emotional lies and valence, Soppe (1988) 
similarly showed that simulations of negative emotions are more difficult to detect than 
suppressed emotional reactions, with simulations of positive emotions being easier to detect. 






Consequently, the valence of the emotion to be simulated may play a role in judging veracity 
(see also Barrett, 1998). It falls to future research to consider these possibilities further. 
General Discussion 
The present work examined how judgments of expression veracity vary with the 
ability to perceive and understand others’ emotional displays and/or the knowledge of 
emotional cues. Study 1 investigated the relationship between individuals’ emotion 
recognition ability and veracity judgments. Contrary to the EBA which predicts a positive 
association we found that emotion recognition resulted in poorer deception detection. Such a 
result would be unexplainable using the accuracy-based approach, yet it is congruent and 
fully interpretable in terms of veracity judgments. As such, the negative correlation between 
accuracy and empathy suggests that high empathy may hinder decoding, potentially due to 
the misinterpretation of deceptive emotions as being genuine (e.g., Baker et al., 2013; 
DesJardins & Hodges, 2015; Israel et al., 2014). Alternatively, less empathic individuals may 
have an advantage in judging veracity as they potentially utilize cues, weigh information, 
and/or judge statements differently, leading to better accuracy (e.g., relying more on content). 
Results further showed that accuracy for detecting subtle and micro-expressions was 
generally high, suggesting that people are capable of accurately perceiving and interpreting 
such brief cues, but this was unrelated to judgment accuracy. 
A speculative explanation for how empathy and emotion recognition relate to veracity 
judgments comes from work on embodied cognition. It has been argued that decoders 
understand the affective state of others by simulating their expressions (Niedenthal, 
Mermillod, Maringer, & Hess, 2010). The sender’s facial expression triggers similar facial 
responses in the observer (i.e. facial mimicry; Hess & Fischer, 2013), inducing the same 
affective state (i.e., leading to emotional contagion; Mafessoni & Lachmann, 2019). Hence, 






genuine and deceptive expressions should produce different activation patterns in the 
mimicker (i.e., reliable muscles). However, research does not find strong support for such 
differences (Krumhuber & Manstead, 2009), nor are decoders capable of discriminating 
emotion authenticity (Zloteanu et al., 2018, 2020). Liars might produce deceptive emotional 
displays that are “good enough” to mislead decoders into inferring they reflect genuine affect. 
It is then feasible to assume that empathy merely lowers the threshold for classifying 
emotional cues as a specific emotion. Research finds that empathy relates to the speed of 
facial processing rather than the accurate classification of emotions (Kosonogov, Titova, & 
Vorobyeva, 2015). In a non-deceptive scenario, this may result in more successful social 
interactions as empathics are quicker to react to the emotional state of others (Jani, Blane, & 
Mercer, 2012). However, empathy may impede accuracy in deceptive scenarios as decoders 
are less critical of emotional information, thereby misinterpreting cues. 
When considering decoder knowledge of emotional cues, Study 2 found that the 
manipulation of emotion recognition ability in the form of training does not aid deception 
detection. This finding has important implications for forensic programs that propagate the 
presence of emotional cues for lie detection (e.g., Inbau et al., 2011). Even if training can 
improve decoders’ knowledge of facial cues (Matsumoto & Hwang, 2011), we think it would 
be insufficient to improve veracity judgments given people’s low ability in distinguishing 
genuine from deceptive displays. Also, individuals may not be able to use the learned cues as 
these conflict with their heuristics and stereotypical beliefs about deceptive cues (Forrest, 
Feldman, & Tyler, 2004). While the current findings do not exclude the possibility of other 
types of training aiding detection, there is no current support for the EBA’s proposed 
relationship between emotion recognition and deception detection.  






The goal of the present research was not to test a novel method for detecting 
deception based on emotional cues (as we have argued, this is not an empirically-supported 
position), but to understand how reliance on emotional information impacts human veracity 
judgments. The absence of a training effect (as evidenced by the Bayes factors) is fully 
expected given the lack of diagnosticity of emotional cues and their rarity in real-world 
scenarios. However, the role of emotionality (as evidenced by the different types of lies) 
corroborates our argument that emotions can affect judgment. Specifically, affective 
unemotional lies were harder to detect than affective emotional lies, replicating the findings 
of Warren et al. (2009).  
To explain this finding, it is important to consider the type of emotions in each 
scenario. While the emotional context was identical for AE and AU videos, senders in the AE 
condition were watching an emotion-evoking video. Re-classifying the emotional lie videos 
as genuine emotional cues (i.e. leaked disgust) and the unemotional lie videos as deceptive 
emotional cues (i.e. fabricated disgust) may help explain the difference in accuracy. If senders 
can produce genuine-looking displays (Krumhuber & Manstead, 2009) and decoders are poor 
at separating emotional authenticity (Zloteanu et al., 2018), then being emotionally perceptive 
is useful for detecting genuine emotions but detrimental for detecting deceptive emotions. 
The current paper also illustrates the need for deception research to consider multiple 
lie scenarios in decoder judgments. While the issue of reliability and generalizability has been 
broached in the past, it still has not been fully addressed. Tasking decoders to judge various 
lie scenarios allows for a more complex understanding of differences (e.g., overall accuracy) 
and similarities (e.g., veracity effects) in performance.  
With the BMEM we were able to analyze all three lie-types together and account for 
the variance introduced in the data by individual senders and decoders. Indeed, the Alt model 






explained more of the variance in the data and performed better at predicting veracity 
judgments, illustrating the importance of considering sender-decoder variability. The analysis 
confirmed that experiential lies (and truths) were detected at similar levels to affective 
emotional lies, and both more accurately than unemotional lies. This indicates that 
unemotional lies were driving the difference, supporting our prediction of decoders being 
misled by deceptive emotional information when making veracity judgments. 
Interestingly, the BMEM revealed that the veracity effect is less pronounced (and 
more uncertain) when accounting for the variability in responding to specific stimuli. This 
may imply that veracity effects observed in the literature are substantially impacted by the 
judgment towards specific senders such as a demeanor bias (Levine, 2016). Hence, a 
response bias (i.e., truth-bias) or an adaptive response strategy (Street, 2015) may not (fully) 
account for veracity-specific accuracy rates. Given this pattern of results, we recommend that 
more attention should be given to both stimulus (sender) and decoder variability. 
Together, findings from both studies support our assumption that decoders may be 
poor at discriminating authentic and deceptive emotional information. We suggest that 
research on emotion recognition separate classification accuracy from authenticity 
discrimination (see Zloteanu et al., 2018). Decoders clearly use emotion-related information 
(diagnostic or otherwise) for veracity judgments; however, contrary to previous propositions 
they do not benefit from focusing on such cues. If decoders cannot separate deceptive from 
genuine emotional cues, their ability to detect them will unreliably relate to detection 
performance. At present, little is known about how people determine emotional authenticity 
(Kappas, Krumhuber, & Küster, 2013; Krumhuber et al., 2014). Failing to account for 
decoders’ ability to discern emotional authenticity will produce mixed results, simply 






reflecting the stimulus type being utilized rather than the effectiveness of training or 
individual performance. 
Limitations 
Emotion recognition is a multi-faceted construct, with facial cue detection and 
empathy being only two aspects. Our findings are limited to the current approach. Measures 
that capture other dimensions such as emotional intelligence (EI; Wojciechowski et al., 2014) 
may show additional effects. Furthermore, judging emotion recognition based on static facial 
displays may not capture the full ability of decoders (Zloteanu et al., 2018). Further research 
should consider other modalities, such as vocal emotions (McKeown, Sneddon, & Curran, 
2014) and body expressions (Van den Stock, Righart, & de Gelder, 2007). 
Another consideration is the training method employed. While our methodology 
reflects an often-used approach in emotion-based deception detection research, it is not the 
only one. Two recent meta-analyses on deception detection training yielded that accuracy is 
moderated by the training being used (Driskell, 2012; Hauch et al., 2014). Interestingly, 
Driskell (2012) found that training on (but not limited to) facial expressions produced the best 
outcome, whereas Hauch et al. (2014) found that training on verbal but nonverbal cues was 
the most effective. Training length may also be a factor, with longer sessions producing 
different results (e.g., Porter, Juodis, ten Brinke, Klein, & Wilson, 2010). 
Another factor relates to the generalizability of decoder judgments to other types of 
lies. Presently, experiential and affective lies were used based on our research aims. However, 
other lies may produce different results, such as sanctioned versus unsanctioned lies (Sporer 
& Schwandt, 2007) or transgressions versus opinions (Matsumoto et al., 2014), as is the role 
of stakes (Frank & Ekman, 1997) or motivation (Forrest & Feldman, 2000). It is important to 
note though that respective moderators have not been found to consistently affect veracity 






judgments (Driskell, 2012; Hartwig & Bond, 2014; Hauch et al., 2014), even when adopting 
approaches similar to ours (Jordan et al., 2019); also, detection ability seems to generally be 
stable (Hartwig & Bond, 2014). 
Future directions 
Expansions of the current work should target additional individual characteristics 
known to relate to emotion recognition, deception ability, and/or interpersonal sensitivity 
(e.g., Hall, Andrzejewski, & Yopchick, 2009). These may concern age and gender effects on 
emotion recognition and expression (for a recent meta-analysis, see Gonçalves et al., 2018). 
For example, Ruffman, Murray, Halberstadt and Vater (2012) reported that older decoders 
perform more poorly than younger decoders at detecting deception, potentially due to the 
slower processing of brief facial cues. Contrary to our findings, they showed a positive 
relation between emotion recognition and overall deception detection ability. This may partly 
be explained by using opinion lies as stimulus material and by not accounting for response 
bias in their analyses. Nevertheless, such work adds to the body of research linking emotion 
recognition and veracity judgments. 
Future studies might want to focus on differences in senders and the sender-decoder 
interaction. For this, work by Riggio and colleagues (Riggio & Friedman, 1986; Riggio et al., 
1987) on social skills and deception ability may be useful in constructing a bi-directional and 
interactive approach (as with IDT). His research details the role of communication skills, 
emotional control, expressivity, and emotion sensitivity in the deception and detection 
process. It corresponds with our supposition that poor veracity judgments based on emotional 
information are partly due to liars producing genuine-looking emotional displays that fool 
decoders (Zloteanu, 2015; Zloteanu et al., 2018) and certain senders being more/less 
believable (i.e., a demeanor bias; Riggio & Friedman, 1983). 






While ecological validity was a consideration in the present research, the 
methodology used here is not the only option to understand the emotion-deception 
relationship. Our focus was on human veracity judgments; nonetheless, computer-based 
approaches may be more beneficial to answer whether it is possible to detect deception from 
emotion-based information. The current findings may be compounded by extraneous factors 
brought about by human detection such as perceptual or processing limitations and 
judgmental biases. However, such research must have strong theoretical and empirical 
foundations (Jupe & Keatley, 2019; Zloteanu, 2020). 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, emotions play a complex role in deception. Facial cue detection was 
not found to aid deception detection, while empathy was negatively related to accurate 
veracity judgments. Training in emotion recognition did not yield any improvements for 
either experiential or affective lies, nor did it result in more biased or overconfident 
judgments. While emotionally charged lies are argued to be easier to detect, here it was the 
experiential lies that had the highest accuracy. Nonetheless, emotions do influence 
detectability as affective unemotional lies were the hardest to judge, suggesting that decoders 
may struggle to utilize emotional information when making veracity judgments due to 
difficulty in discriminating genuine from deceptive emotional cues. As an alternative to 
traditional accuracy-based approaches, the present research demonstrates that a shift towards 
veracity judgment is more theoretically sound and compatible with empirical findings. This 
allows for the interpretation of improbable relationships under the EBA (such as the lack of 
positive effects of training or empathy) by considering the mental processes, biases, and 
limitations of human judges. 
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Figure 1.  
Deception Detection Accuracy based on Training Condition and Lie-Type 
 
Note. Mean accuracy (error bars ±1 SE) for emotion recognition training (ERT), bogus 
training (BT), and no training (NT) by video set, i.e. experiential (EXP) and affective (AFF), 
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